14 August 2007

Definitia liberului arbitru

Free will commonly entails not only the subjective notion of willing to do something, but also that nobody but myself would be able to predict my behavior. … Along those lines, in the Behavioral Sciences one may therefore want to define free will a little differently. For an individual to possess free will, it would only require that: (1) all of the causes of the behavior are intra-individual and (2) the individual's behaviors are not predictable (within a level of scientific certainty) by someone else who is extra-individual. It is not that difficult to satisfy both requirements, depending on how certain of the above terms are defined. This definition explicitly does not touch the subjective feeling of free will, which I think is an advantage. This definition would allow for a conversion of free will from a philosophical question to a biological study area. The subjective experience of free will would then, consequentially, fall into the topic of consciousness.
Björn Brembs